Abstract
/∂x ≤ 0. If large applications of fertilizer may result in burn damage in low rainfall years, then fertilizer may be regarded as a strongly riskincreasing input, at least for some values of x.
The first stage of the analysis is to consider the equilibrium in the absence of insurance.
For risk-neutral producers, the equilibrium condition is simply
and for risk-averse producers
A standard argument (eg Sandmo 1971) shows that the level of the control variable will be below the risk-neutral level whenever ∂f 1 /∂x is higher in the good state than in the bad state, and hence is negatively correlated with U'( i ). The following result, then, characterizes the impact of risk aversion. . The producer's profit is now given by a functions * where
The marginal return to the input is now given by
First consider the impact of insurance for a risk-neutral producer. Equation (1) This is the standard moral hazard problem which affects all insurance contracts. The insured person has an incentive to undertake actions which increase losses in adverse states of the world and to refrain from actions which would mitigate losses in those states of the world.
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Now consider the situation of a risk-averse producer. It is useful to observe that the presence of insurance means the marginal return to the input is lower in the bad state than the good state whenever the marginal product is positive in the good state, and this will always be true when (1*) is satisfied. That is, under insurance, the input is effectively risk-increasing.
Hence, from Observation 1, it follows that
Observation 3: For a risk-averse producer, input demand under insurance will be below the risk-neutral level.
From Observations 1 and 3 , it follows that for risk-reducing or risk-constant inputs, the effect of insurance is to move the risk-averse producers from an input use level at or above the risk-neutral level to one below the risk-neutral level. At the same time, from Observation 2, the risk-neutral input level is falling. Hence
Observation 4: For a risk-averse producer, insurance will reduce input demand whenever the input is risk-reducing or risk-constant.
In order to deal with the case of risk-increasing inputs, it is necessary to derive the analog of (2)
A continuous shift from the original position to the insurance position may be represented in terms of a parameter , such that returns are given by
For a strongly risk-increasing input, all of these terms are positive.
Observation 5: For a risk-averse producer, insurance will increase input demand whenever the input is strongly risk-increasing.
We are left with an ambiguous result for the remaining class of risk-increasing inputs.
For these inputs, the moral hazard effect, given by the first term in the RHS of (3) would lead to a reduction in input use, but the risk effects, given by the other two terms, are positive, reflecting the fact that insurance reduces the riskiness of income and encourages more use of risk-increasing inputs. As ∂f 2 /∂x rises, the moral hazard effect will gradually come to predominate. The results may be summarized in the diagram below (Figure 1 ).
The diagram may be understood as follows. The vertical axis, denoted ∆x, shows the change in input demand associated with insurance. The horizontal axis shows ∂f 2 /∂x, marginal product in the bad state. In any equilibrium, the marginal product must be less than or equal to w in one state and greater than or equal to w in the other. Hence the input is risk-reducing (constant, increasing) as ∂f 2 /∂x > (=, <) w. By definition the input is strongly risk-increasing when ∂f 2 /∂x ≤ 0. Thus the crossing point for risk-averse producers must lie in the range [0,w] . By Observations 1 and 3, the insurance effects for risk-neutral and risk-averse producers must also intersect somewhere in this interval, as shown.
Figure 1: Effects of insurance for risk-averse and risk-neutral farmers
In order to determine the crossing points, is useful to consider a range of insurance contracts, beginning with the 'zero contract' in which c = 0 and y*= f 2 (y), where f 2 is evaluated at the initial level of input use. A higher level of insurance corresponds to an increase in c and y*.
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Under the zero contract, the second and third terms in the RHS of (3) are zero, and the input demand effect of insurance is unambiguously negative whenever ∂f 2 /∂x is positive. As the level of insurance rises, both of these positive terms increase and the crossover point rises.
The discussion so far has focused on the effects of insurance on input demand. Whenever marginal product is positive in both states, the change in output will have the same sign as the change in input. When marginal product is negative in one state, it is necessary to consider the change in expected output. For a risk-neutral producer, the expected value of marginal product Observation 5*: Assume ∂f/∂x is positive for all > *. Then, for a risk-averse producer, insurance will increase input demand whenever the input is strongly risk-increasing with respect to *.
Finally, the results on bankruptcy carry over neatly. For a risk-reducing input the effect of bankruptcy provisions is to eliminate from consideration the states in which net marginal returns are highest. By the concavity of f, the optimality conditions can only be restored by a reduction in input use. The converse argument applies for risk-increasing inputs. Observation 6 is thus carried over without modification.
Observation 6*: The existence of bankruptcy provisions will increase input demand if the input is risk-increasing and reduce it if the input is risk-reducing.
Note, however, that the optimum is no longer the same regardless of the level of risk-aversion, as in the two-state case. The elimination of a subset of bad states does not change the basic form of the problem, and Observation 1 applies to the solution in the presence of bankruptcy provisions.
Thus the results from the two-state case carry across with comparatively minor restrictions on f(x, ). With additional effort, these restrictions could certainly be weakened further, but it would appear that the point of diminishing returns has been reached.
It is also straightforward to relax the assumption of a single variable input. Consider instead a generalized Pope-Just production function of the form
Here z is a vector of risk-constant inputs and has the properties already derived. By optimizing out with respect to z a production function of the form f(x, ) is derived. The input x is risk-reducing for f(x, ) if and only if it is risk-reducing for h(x, ).
Concluding Comments
There are a number of state-contingent market and public policy instruments which affect states yielding outcomes in the lower tail of some distribution. In addition to the cases of insurance and bankruptcy considered here, these include stock options and minimum guaranteed income schemes. It seems likely that decision problems involving these instruments could be modelled in terms of production and that effects on input demand would be of interest. It would also be useful to extend the analysis presented here to take account of interactions between multiple inputs, all of which affect risk.
